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## Excerpts from Presidential Candidate Mousavi's statement about fraud in the Iranian presidential election

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Illegal use of governmental and public resources and capabilities ... It is strange that the Guardian Council has rejected the qualifications of hundreds of candidates for Majlis election over minor excuses, or has annulled the results of the elections on the basis of certain allegations, such as bribery (for instance, on charges that some people have been given one course of a meal). It reserves the right for itself to revise its view about the result of the election at every stage that it finds necessary, or even to annul the election or to reject some ballot boxes, so that in its words it can remove any traces of possible violations. However, it has remained silent in the face of all these offenses, the violation of [firm] principles of the Constitution, and the loss of the requirements of honesty and piety, while on the basis of article 58 of the presidential election law, it was duty-bound to disqualify Mr. [Mahmoud] Ahmadinezhad.

... There has been the comprehensive engineering of the presidential election, comprehensive organization and the quarantine-like structure of the Interior Ministry, right to the lowest ranks of the national election headquarters and the executive groups.

... All the employees and experts in the election office of the Interior Ministry were suddenly changed, and they were replaced with some individuals from outside the ministry ... The employees in the counting sites of the Interior Ministry were also changed.

... That uniformity was even extended to the officials serving in polling stations.

... There were comprehensive purges and efforts were made to make all the personnel [in charge of the election] uniform ...

... They created a closed system that was limited to a few select individuals from the supervisory and executive groups. For instance, on the election day, only Messrs Mahsuli [interior minister], Daneshju [the person in charge of election HQ] and one other person were present in the headquarters for collation [tajmi'] of the votes. The representatives of the candidates were not able even to get close to that room.

[Partiality of] Guardian Council

In view of the evidence of the stances adopted by the members of the Guardian Council in the course of the presidential polls, the Guardian Council has not been impartial.

Altogether, seven members of the Guardian Council have adopted stances in support of Mr. Ahmadinezhad, and some of them have even taken part in trips and given lectures in his support.

... The clear departure of the Interior Ministry from the existing regulations regarding the collating and announcing the results of the votes has met with the indifference and the lack of involvement by the Guardian Council ... the results of the counting of votes from different constituencies were announced directly, in violation of the above-mentioned regulations, and without the supervision of the representatives of different candidates. Those results were directly sent to the Interior Ministry, and there too they were collated and announced, again without the supervision of the representatives of the candidates. The central supervisory group appointed by the Guardian Council ignored the protests made by the representatives of the candidates.

## Cheating in ballot papers and votes

The number of ballot papers that are printed for each election and are used must be based on the number of eligible voters, which is provided by the Iranian Statistics Center and the Registry Office. Normally in order to prevent the shortage of ballot papers a reasonable number of extra ballot papers will be printed.

During this election, despite the fact the Iranian Statistics Center and the Registry Office had given the number of the eligible voters to be about 45,200,000, nevertheless, 59,600,000 ballot papers with serial numbers had been printed. Those ballot papers had been printed and sent in advance to the 30 provinces of the country on the basis of serial numbers and by taking into account the identification codes [for each batch of ballot papers] on the basis of the eligible voters in each province.

According to the announcement of the relevant officials and the confirmation of some members of the Guardian Council on 21/3/88 [11 June 2009], one day before the election the printing press of the Markazi [Central] Bank had printed millions of extra ballot papers without serial numbers. The printing of that number of additional ballot papers, despite the considerable number of 59 million ballot papers that had been printed earlier on, especially without serial numbers, is by itself the cause of serious suspicion regarding the process of the election, and is worth paying attention to.

What has been the aim of printing and distributing between 22 and 32 million extra ballot papers that have been put at the disposal of those in charge of running the election, which has been unprecedented in the past 30 years and in the course of 29 elections?

Do not all the above-mentioned cases confirm the likelihood of extensive illegal activities and the casting of rigged ballot papers in the boxes? Have not tens of millions of extra ballot papers been subjected to the suspicious process of engineering the votes cast in the ballot boxes, especially the mobile boxes and shadow [as published] boxes?

The above-mentioned cases show that at this stage the necessary ground had been prepared for engineering the number of votes cast [stuffing the ballot boxes].

## Additional seals

The normal practice in previous elections has been to prepare enough seals in keeping with the number of polling stations, plus 10 per cent. The 10 percent extra seals were prepared for cases that could not be predicted, such as some of those seals being broken at the polling stations. The practice has always been to provide one seal for every ballot box.

During these polls, over 100,000 seals were prepared, which has been unprecedented in any previous election. This time, the number of seals has been twice the number of all polling stations, plus 10 percent extra. This action has lacked any legal legitimacy and could have paved the way for extensive cheating.

## The shortage of ballot papers

Thousands of polling stations in different parts of the country, including in Eastern Azerbaijan, Fars and Lorestan provinces suffered from the shortage of ballot papers from 10:00 a.m. or 11.00 a.m. This shortage resulted in the suspension of voting in those stations for many hours.

In view of the printing of millions of extra ballot papers, the extreme inefficiency that had been experienced in the distribution of ballot papers to the polling stations seems very suspicious. This suspicion was further strengthened by the fact that the shortage of ballot papers was experienced mainly in big cities, such as Tabriz and Shiraz and in northern, eastern and western parts of Tehran [presumably where most of the supporters of the

reformist candidates lived]. This was something that had happened for the first time during the past 30 years.

#### Violations in the course of voting

Extensive restrictions had been imposed on the presence of Mr. [Mirhossein] Mousavi's representatives in fixed and mobile polling stations, and they had been prevented from effectively observing the voting.

Many representatives could not be certain that the boxes had been empty before they were locked and sealed, and in some cases the boxes were not closed and sealed. This violation is one of the major problems in the course of voting and could have been the cause of extensive cheating.

#### 'Mobile' ballot boxes

From some time before the election it was made clear that the Interior Ministry had planned to have 14,000 mobile polling stations, or nearly one-third of the entire number of polling stations

According to the single article of the law on the election of the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the use of mobile polling stations is allowed only for mountainous regions that are difficult to access, for remote places and for 24-hour premises such as hospitals and prisons where it is not possible to have fixed polling stations. However, it has been observed that mobile polling stations had been used in the main urban squares and streets, and even in places where there had been a fixed polling station nearby.

The result of the votes cast in the ballot boxes that have been announced by the Interior Ministry shows that, despite engineering the votes in all the fixed or mobile ballot boxes, the results from the mobile ballot boxes show a considerable and meaningful difference in favor of Mr. Ahmadinezhad. In other words, the volume of violations and cheating in the mobile ballot boxes has been much higher than in the fixed ballot boxes.

#### The counting and collating of votes

The votes were counted directly in each constituency, without going through the processes of sending them to the executive teams in each district, and finally to the offices of the governors.

... The haste shown by the Interior Ministry in announcing the results meant that the percentage of votes received by the first and second candidates with the highest number of votes was maintained in an unusual way in the form of a straight line. We also did not have any blank or spoiled ballots. This [lack of spoilt votes] was a point that was noticed after the results of 30 million votes had been counted and was then corrected.

Contrary to usual practices, the announcement of the results was carried out without coordinating the figures with the Guardian Council. The results of the votes that had been counted were announced directly and without their collation at the towns where voting had taken place, and under the supervision of the representatives of the candidates, and without announcing them to the Interior Ministry. At the ministry too they were collated and announced without the supervision of the representatives of the candidates.

#### Statistical proofs of cheating

This theory becomes more noteworthy when the above-mentioned test is carried out in each city of different provinces. The outcome of the test at the level of provincial towns also shows that there were clear statistical contradictions in 78 towns of the country. The total number of votes in those towns, whose inaccuracy has been proved in practice amounts to 11,175,853 votes.

## Confusion about level of participation

Another ambiguous point regarding the number of votes that has been reported by the esteemed Interior Ministry is that the number of votes have been larger than the number of eligible voters in some provinces, provincial cities and districts of the country. At provincial levels, in Yazd and Mazandaran provinces more votes had been cast in the ballot boxes than the one hundred per cent of the number of eligible voters.

Testing the above theory in various districts is very interesting, so much so that 60 towns and 192 districts in different parts of the country have had more than one hundred per cent participation right up to 211 per cent participation. There are also 125 towns where one can see more than 95 per cent participation.

In view of the above-mentioned cases, the balance sheet of the election results in 192 districts is under a question mark, and in practice there is suspicion regarding 3,898,227 votes out of all the votes cast [presumably in those districts].

On the other hand, even though such a [generalized] theory ... requires proper proof, nevertheless, even that argument reveals an organized plot to rig the election. Even if we assume that X number of eligible voters have gone from the city A to the city B, then we should subtract the same number of voters from the city A. In other words, the explanation provided by the Interior Ministry would mean that we should see that the number of votes in other provinces have also been tampered with. This means that all cities have to some extent shared in this tampering.

In other words, there has been organized cheating throughout the country.

*The above article comprises excerpts from candidate Mirhossein Mousavi's statement on fraud in the Iranian presidential election, and is taken from the Qalam News Website, Tehran, and translated from Persian by the BBC Monitoring Services on July 5. 2009.*